PHPE 400 Individual and Group Decision Making

Eric Pacuit
University of Maryland
pacuit.org

Politics
Coase Theorem
Harsanyis Theorem Philosophy
May's Theorem Gaus
Nash Condorcets Paradox
Rational Choice Theory
Arrows Social Choice Theory Sen

Arrows Theorem

Arrows Theorem

Arrows Theorem

Arrows Theorem

Pareto Harsanyi
Arrows Theorem

Lotteries



Suppose that $X = \{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$ is a set of outcomes.

A **lottery** over X is a tuple is a function that assigns to each outcome o the probability that o obtains. That is, it is a function $p: X \to [0,1]$ such that

$$p(x_1) + p(x_2) + \cdots + p(x_n) = \sum_{x \in X} p(x) = 1$$



Suppose that $X = \{a, b, c\}$. The lottery $p : X \to [0, 1]$ that assigns:

- ▶ a probability of 0.6 to *a* (denoted p(a) = 0.6),
- ▶ a probability of 0.1 to *b* (denoted p(b) = 0.1), and
- ightharpoonup a probability of 0.3 to c (denoted p(c)=0.3) is depicted in any of the following ways:



Suppose that $X = \{a, b, c\}$. The lottery $p : X \to [0, 1]$ that assigns:


- ► a probability of 0.6 to *a* (denoted p(a) = 0.6),
- ▶ a probability of 0.1 to *b* (denoted p(b) = 0.1), and
- ▶ a probability of 0.3 to c (denoted p(c) = 0.3) is depicted in any of the following ways:

$$0.6 \cdot a + 0.1 \cdot b + 0.3 \cdot c$$



Suppose that $X = \{a, b, c\}$. The lottery $p : X \to [0, 1]$ that assigns:

- ▶ a probability of 0.6 to *a* (denoted p(a) = 0.6),
- ▶ a probability of 0.1 to b (denoted p(b) = 0.1), and
- ▶ a probability of 0.3 to c (denoted p(c) = 0.3) is depicted in any of the following ways:






Suppose that $X = \{a, b, c\}$. The lottery $p : X \to [0, 1]$ that assigns:

- ▶ a probability of 0.6 to *a* (denoted p(a) = 0.6),
- ▶ a probability of 0.1 to *b* (denoted p(b) = 0.1), and
- ▶ a probability of 0.3 to c (denoted p(c) = 0.3) is depicted in any of the following ways:

 $0.6 \cdot a + 0.1 \cdot b + 0.3 \cdot c$



$$\begin{array}{c|ccc}
0.6 & 0.1 & 0.3 \\
\hline
 a & b & c
\end{array}$$



What matters in a lottery is the probability assigned to the outcomes.



What matters in a lottery is the probability assigned to the outcomes.

Let
$$L_1 = 0.5 \cdot a + 0.5 \cdot b$$
 and $L_2 = 0.4 \cdot b + 0.6 \cdot c$.



What matters in a lottery is the probability assigned to the outcomes.

Let
$$L_1 = 0.5 \cdot a + 0.5 \cdot b$$
 and $L_2 = 0.4 \cdot b + 0.6 \cdot c$.

$$0.25 \cdot L_1 + 0.75 \cdot L_2 = 0.25 \cdot (0.5 \cdot a + 0.5 \cdot b) + 0.75 \cdot (0.4 \cdot b + 0.6 \cdot c)$$



What matters in a lottery is the probability assigned to the outcomes.

Let
$$L_1 = 0.5 \cdot a + 0.5 \cdot b$$
 and $L_2 = 0.4 \cdot b + 0.6 \cdot c$.

$$0.25 \cdot L_1 + 0.75 \cdot L_2 = 0.25 \cdot (0.5 \cdot a + 0.5 \cdot b) + 0.75 \cdot (0.4 \cdot b + 0.6 \cdot c)$$

$$= (0.25 \times 0.5) \cdot a + (0.25 \times 0.5 + 0.75 \times 0.4) \cdot b + (0.75 \times 0.6) \cdot c$$



What matters in a lottery is the probability assigned to the outcomes.

Let
$$L_1 = 0.5 \cdot a + 0.5 \cdot b$$
 and $L_2 = 0.4 \cdot b + 0.6 \cdot c$.

$$0.25 \cdot L_{1} + 0.75 \cdot L_{2} = 0.25 \cdot (0.5 \cdot a + 0.5 \cdot b) + 0.75 \cdot (0.4 \cdot b + 0.6 \cdot c)$$

$$= (0.25 \times 0.5) \cdot a + (0.25 \times 0.5 + 0.75 \times 0.4) \cdot b + (0.75 \times 0.6) \cdot c$$

$$= 0.125 \cdot a + 0.425 \cdot b + 0.45 \cdot c$$



Suppose that *X* is a set of outcomes and $\mathcal{L}(X)$ is the set of all lotteries over *X*.



Suppose that *X* is a set of outcomes and $\mathcal{L}(X)$ is the set of all lotteries over *X*.

Given a rational preference on *X*, how should the decision maker compare lotteries?

What additional properties should a *rational preference* (P, I) on $\mathcal{L}(X)$ satisfy?



Suppose that $X = \{a, b, c\}$ and the decision maker has the strict preference

a P b P c



Suppose that $X = \{a, b, c\}$ and the decision maker has the strict preference

a P b P c

Consider the lotteries $L_1 = 0.5 \cdot a + 0.5 \cdot c$ and $L_2 = 1 \cdot b$

The decision maker's ranking of L_1 and L_2 depends on whether b is "closer to" a than to c.



Suppose that $X = \{a, b, c\}$ and the decision maker has the strict preference

Consider the lotteries $L_1 = 0.5 \cdot a + 0.5 \cdot c$ and $L_2 = 1 \cdot b$

The decision maker's ranking of L_1 and L_2 depends on whether b is "closer to" a than to c.

$$\overbrace{a}^{u(a)-u(b)}\underbrace{b}_{u(b)-u(c)}\underbrace{c}$$

Ordinal vs. Cardinal Utility



Ordinal Utility: Qualitative comparisons of objects allowed, no information about differences or ratios.

Ordinal vs. Cardinal Utility



Ordinal Utility: Qualitative comparisons of objects allowed, no information about differences or ratios.

Cardinal Utility:

Interval scale: Quantitative comparisons of objects, accurately reflects differences between objects.

E.g., the difference between 75°F and 70°F is the same as the difference between 30°F and 25°F However, 70°F (= 21.11°C) is **not** twice as hot as 35°F (= 1.67°C).

Ordinal vs. Cardinal Utility



Ordinal Utility: Qualitative comparisons of objects allowed, no information about differences or ratios.

Cardinal Utility:

Interval scale: Quantitative comparisons of objects, accurately reflects differences between objects.

E.g., the difference between 75°F and 70°F is the same as the difference between 30°F and 25°F However, 70°F (= 21.11°C) is **not** twice as hot as 35°F (= 1.67°C).

Ratio scale: Quantitative comparisons of objects, accurately reflects ratios between objects. E.g., 10lb (= 4.53592kg) is twice as much as 5lb (= 2.26796kg).

Measuring Utility



L. Narens and B. Skyrms (2020). *The Pursuit of Happiness: Philosophical and Psychological Foundations of Utility*. Oxford University Press.

I. Moscati (2018). *Measuring Utility From the Marginal Revolution to Behavioral Economics*. Oxford University Press.

Expected utility





Suppose that the outcomes of a lottery are monetary values:

$$L = p_1 \cdot x_1 + p_2 \cdot x_2 + \dots + p_n \cdot x_n$$

where each x_i is an amount of money.

The **expected value** of L is:

$$EV(p_1 \cdot x_1 + p_2 \cdot x_2 + \dots + p_n \cdot x_n) = p_1 \times x_1 + \dots + p_n \times x_n$$
$$= \sum_{i=1}^n p_i \times x_i$$





Suppose that the outcomes of a lottery are monetary values:

$$L = p_1 \cdot x_1 + p_2 \cdot x_2 + \dots + p_n \cdot x_n$$

where each x_i is an amount of money.

The **expected value** of L is:

$$EV(p_1 \cdot x_1 + p_2 \cdot x_2 + \dots + p_n \cdot x_n) = p_1 \times x_1 + \dots + p_n \times x_n$$
$$= \sum_{i=1}^n p_i \times x_i$$

E.g., if
$$L = 0.55 \cdot \$100 + 0.25 \cdot \$50 + 0.2 \cdot \$0$$
, then

$$EV(L) = 0.55 \times 100 + 0.25 \times 50 + 0.2 \times 0 = 67.5$$

You are given a choice between two lotteries L_1 and L_2 . The outcome of the lotteries is determined by flipping a fair coin. The payoff for the two lotteries are given in the following table:

	Heads	Tails
L_1	\$1M	\$1M
L_2	\$3M	\$0

Which of the two lotteries would you choose?

- 1. L_1
- 2. L_2
- 3. I am indifferent between the two lotteries



Suppose that $X = \{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$ and $u : X \to \mathbb{R}$ is a utility function on X.

The **expected utility** of a lottery *L* with respect to *u* is defined as follows:

$$EU(p_1 \cdot x_1 + \dots + p_n \cdot x_n, u) = p_1 \times u(x_1) + \dots + p_n \times u(x_n)$$
$$= \sum_{i=1}^n p_i \times u(x_i)$$



Suppose that $X = \{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$ and $u : X \to \mathbb{R}$ is a utility function on X.

The **expected utility** of a lottery *L* with respect to *u* is defined as follows:

$$EU(p_1 \cdot x_1 + \dots + p_n \cdot x_n, u) = p_1 \times u(x_1) + \dots + p_n \times u(x_n)$$
$$= \sum_{i=1}^n p_i \times u(x_i)$$



Suppose that $X = \{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$ and $u : X \to \mathbb{R}$ is a utility function on X.

The **expected utility** of a lottery *L* with respect to *u* is defined as follows:

$$EU(p_1 \cdot x_1 + \dots + p_n \cdot x_n, u) = p_1 \times u(x_1) + \dots + p_n \times u(x_n)$$
$$= \sum_{i=1}^n p_i \times u(x_i)$$

$$EU(0.25 \cdot a + 0.25 \cdot b + 0.5 \cdot c, u)$$



Suppose that $X = \{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$ and $u : X \to \mathbb{R}$ is a utility function on X.

The **expected utility** of a lottery *L* with respect to *u* is defined as follows:

$$EU(p_1 \cdot x_1 + \dots + p_n \cdot x_n, u) = p_1 \times u(x_1) + \dots + p_n \times u(x_n)$$
$$= \sum_{i=1}^n p_i \times u(x_i)$$

$$EU(0.25 \cdot a + 0.25 \cdot b + 0.5 \cdot c, u) = 0.25 \times u(a) + 0.25 \times u(b) + 0.5 \times u(c)$$



Suppose that $X = \{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$ and $u : X \to \mathbb{R}$ is a utility function on X.

The **expected utility** of a lottery *L* with respect to *u* is defined as follows:

$$EU(p_1 \cdot x_1 + \dots + p_n \cdot x_n, u) = p_1 \times u(x_1) + \dots + p_n \times u(x_n)$$
$$= \sum_{i=1}^n p_i \times u(x_i)$$

$$EU(0.25 \cdot a + 0.25 \cdot b + 0.5 \cdot c, u) = 0.25 \times u(a) + 0.25 \times u(b) + 0.5 \times u(c)$$

= 0.25 \times 2 + 0.25 \times 4 + 0.5 \times 0



Suppose that $X = \{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$ and $u : X \to \mathbb{R}$ is a utility function on X.

The **expected utility** of a lottery *L* with respect to *u* is defined as follows:

$$EU(p_1 \cdot x_1 + \dots + p_n \cdot x_n, u) = p_1 \times u(x_1) + \dots + p_n \times u(x_n)$$
$$= \sum_{i=1}^n p_i \times u(x_i)$$

$$EU(0.25 \cdot a + 0.25 \cdot b + 0.5 \cdot c, u) = 0.25 \times u(a) + 0.25 \times u(b) + 0.5 \times u(c)$$

$$= 0.25 \times 2 + 0.25 \times 4 + 0.5 \times 0$$

$$= 0.5 + 1 + 0$$

$$= 1.5$$



Suppose that $X = \{a, b, c\}$ and the decision maker has the strict preference

a P b P c



Suppose that $X = \{a, b, c\}$ and the decision maker has the strict preference

a P b P c



Suppose that $X = \{a, b, c\}$ and the decision maker has the strict preference

a P b P c

	a	b	С		
u_1	4	1.5	1	$u_1(a) > u_1(b) > u_1(c)$	$EU(L_1,u_1) > EU(L_2,u_1)$
u_2	4	2.5	1	$u_2(a) > u_2(b) > u_2(c)$	$EU(L_1, u_2) = EU(L_2, u_2)$
u_3	4	3	1	$u_3(a) > u_3(b) > u_3(c)$	$EU(L_1, u_3) < EU(L_2, u_3)$



Suppose that $X = \{a, b, c\}$ and the decision maker has the strict preference

aPbPc

Consider the lotteries $L_1 = 0.5 \cdot a + 0.5 \cdot c$ and $L_2 = 1 \cdot b$

	а	b	С		
u_1	4	1.5	1	$u_1(a) > u_1(b) > u_1(c)$	$EU(L_1,u_1) > EU(L_2,u_1)$
u_2	4	2.5	1	$u_2(a) > u_2(b) > u_2(c)$	$EU(L_1,u_2)=EU(L_2,u_2)$
u_3	4	3	1	$u_3(a) > u_3(b) > u_3(c)$	$EU(L_1, u_3) < EU(L_2, u_3)$

Problem: u_1 , u_2 , and u_3 each represent the decision maker's preferences, but rank L_1 and L_2 differently according to the expected utility.