# PHPE 400 Individual and Group Decision Making

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A **relation** on *X* is a set of **ordered pairs** from *X*.

That is, if *R* is a relation on *X*, then  $R \subseteq X \times X$ .



Example:  $X = \{a, b, c, d\}, R = \{(a, a), (b, a), (c, d), (a, c), (d, d)\}$ 





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Can *any* relation on *X* represent a strict preference for a decision maker?

# Symmetric/Asymmetric Relations

Suppose that *X* is a set and  $R \subseteq X \times X$  is a relation.

**Symmetric relation**: for all  $x, y \in X$ , if x R y, then y R x

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The underlying idea is that if *P* represents the decision maker's strict preference and x P y (i.e., the decision maker strictly prefers x to y), then the decision maker would pay some non-zero amount money to trade y for x.

**Assumption**: *P* is asymmetric (for all  $x, y \in X$ , if x P y, then it is not the case that y P x, written not-y P x).

## Indifference/Incommensurable



Suppose that *P* is an asymmetric relation on *X* (interpreted as a decision maker's strict preference). Suppose that  $x, y \in X$  with not-*x P y* and not-*y P x*.

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There are two reasons why this might hold:

- 1. The decision maker is *indifferent* between *x* and *y*. In this case, we write *x I y*.
- 2. The decision maker *cannot compare x* and *y*. In this case, we write *x N y*.

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What properties should *I* and *N* satisfy?

### **Reflexive Relations**



Suppose that *X* is a set and  $R \subseteq X \times X$  is a relation.

**Reflexive relation**: for all  $x \in X$ , x R x





# **Representing Preferences**



# Let *X* be a set of outcomes. A decision maker's *preference* over *X* is represented by *relations* on *X*:

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- N ⊆ X × X where a N b means that the decision maker *cannot compare a* and b.

## Preferences - Minimal Constraints



A decision maker's preferences on *X* is represented by three relations  $P \subseteq X \times X$ ,  $I \subseteq X \times X$  and  $N \subseteq X \times X$  satisfying the following minimal constraints:

- 1. For all  $x, y \in X$ , exactly one of x P y, y P x, x I y and x N y is true.
- 2. *P* is asymmetric
- 3. *I* is reflexive and symmetric.
- 4. *N* is symmetric.

### **Rational Preferences**



# An individual's preferences are **rational** when they satisfy two additional constraints:

- 1. transitivity
- 2. completeness



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